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abStRact
Relational accounts acknowledge and emphasise the intersubjective nature of selfhood 
and argue that focusing solely on the capacities of animals cannot account for all moral 
obligations towards them. My argument is concerned with the move from the premise of 
intersubjectivity to differential positive duties. Relationality here functions as a means of dif-
ferentiating and refining our positive duties towards some animals, but this refinement often 
also functions as an exclusion of others, e.g. in the differential treatment of domesticated and 
wild animals. A similar danger lies in diminishing human moral obligation by arguing for 
accepting some cases of suffering and death as unavoidable tragedies. I argue that the debate 
about the nature and scope of our relational duties towards other animals can profit from 
the relational ethics of Martin Buber and Emmanuel Levinas. Buber and Levinas develop 
relational accounts, in which the fundamental ethical element is not knowledge of the capaci-
ties of the other but rather the encounter, out of which moral selfhood emerges. By applying 
Buber and Levinas we can refine the way relationality is used in animal ethics today without 
dismissing our positive duties towards individual animals, in the wild or otherwise. 
Keywords: Buber, Levinas, ethics, animal ethics, responsibility, obligation, suffer-
ing, encounter, relational ethics, animals in the wild.
One reason why the problem of wild animals is such a challenge to animal 
ethics today is because it points directly at the core question of not only 
animal ethics but ethics in general: what are our moral obligations towards 
the other? The case of wild animals is where many common moral 
intuitions seem to cluster around a set of seemingly unsolvable problems: 
respecting sovereignty and autonomy seems to clash with duties of care and 
beneficence while these in turn raise concerns about human fallibility. 
An influential approach to the problem of wild animals is one that 
recognizes the importance of relations. While there is a wide variety of 
relational accounts, many acknowledge and emphasize the intersubjective 
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nature of selfhood and argue that focusing solely on the capacities of the 
other cannot account for all moral obligations towards her. Both negative 
duties of respecting the basic rights of others and positive duties, which 
take into account the nature and history of existing relations are under-
stood as a matter of the intersubjective recognition of selfhood. 
Relational accounts of human moral obligations towards other animals 
thus share the premise that considering the capabilities of an animal is not 
sufficient for determining the right attitude or action towards an animal 
other. Using terms of interests or rights, taking into account the capaci-
ties of animals is necessary – whether an entity is sentient, has a subjective 
first-person view on life, a sense of self etc. are all directly relevant to the 
question what can make her life go better or worse. Relations, especially 
with human moral agents add to these considerations, they are not rivals 
to the capacities account (Palmer 2010). In the following I shall take this 
comprehensive and complementary moral approach as my starting point.
Relations between agents and patients can cover anything from individ-
ual companionship to membership in a common polity. Proponents argue 
that while capacity oriented accounts can and must be used for establishing 
our basic duties towards other animals, they are not capable of accounting 
for specific, additional duties, which emerge out of relations with them. 
Individual animals (including humans) are not only “members of a spe-
cies, but they are also members of an interspecies community” (Donaldson 
and Kymlicka 2011, 97) and taking the social and historical context of 
our group memberships and relations into account is required for justice. 
An example is Donaldson and Kymlicka’s account of our positive duties 
to domesticated animals: we have to take the history of that relation into 
account, which has bred certain traits into animals “which increase both 
their dependency on humans and their utility for humans, with no atten-
tion to the animals’ own interests” (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 75). 
Clare Palmer argues that humans can have special obligations on the basis 
of “human/animal entanglements, histories, and shared institutional frame-
works where humans are, or have been, either responsible for harms to ani-
mals or for the generation of particular vulnerabilities in animals” (Palmer 
2010, 89). Such histories found positive duties to assist other animals but 
without these we have no such obligation (ibid.).
My argument is concerned with the move from the premise of inter-
subjectivity to differential positive duties on the basis of our relations to 
other animals. Relationality here functions as a means of differentiating 
and refining our positive duties towards some animals but this refinement 
often also functions as an exclusion of others. The paradigmatic example 
for this is the different moral treatment of domesticated and wild animals 
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with the endorsement of laissez-faire attitudes in varying degrees when it 
comes to the latter. At times, these choices are based on legitimate con-
cerns such as fallibility, i.e. the concern that even with the best intentions, 
human agency is fallible and we may end up causing more harm than that 
we are trying to combat. The result of such considerations is that our 
duties of non-maleficence take precedence over duties of beneficence and 
that in cases of potential conflict, we should not intervene to assist wild 
animals in need.
The different moral intuitions underlying negative and positive duties 
reflect our limited resources as moral-problem-solvers: 
In general, our negative obligations to others (not to kill, confine, torture, 
enslave them, or rob them of the necessities of life) are “compossible” – that 
is, these obligations do not conflict with one another. […] Many positive 
obligations, on the other hand, are not compossible. Assisting one animal in 
relation to one potential harm is likely to compete with other ways of helping 
other animals. (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 162)
It is here that discretion is often put forward as the solution. We do not 
seem to have developed a moral framework in which we can satisfactorily 
respond to the problem of wild animals so that in many cases
It is also argued that equal consideration does not generate an obligation to 
benefit wild animals by rescuing them from harm (as some have supposed); 
our general obligation to benefit those in need is discretionary in the sense 
that we may choose, among the many worthy causes, which ones to support. 
(DeGrazia 1999, 124)
The problem I see here is that the move from a relational or intersubjec-
tive foundation of ethics to a differentiated account of our specific obliga-
tions can lead to too wide and arbitrary a use of discretion. Often this goes 
together with a sort of moral dismissal of what may be due to others as in 
cases such as wild animals in what I shall call grandmother ethics. 
In the following I shall argue that the debate around the source, nature 
and scope of our relational duties towards other animals in general and 
wild animals in particular can profit from the relational ethics of Martin 
Buber and Emmanuel Levinas. This is because in Buber and Levinas we 
have two examples of precisely the move from the relation or encounter as 
the fundamental ethical category to moral obligations without an accept-
ance of discretion as a legitimate solution.
It may be surprising that I turn to Buber and Levinas because neither is 
free of anthropocentrism and Levinas is in fact notorious for his persistent 
agnosticism regarding the place of other animals in ethics. Nevertheless, 
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by turning to Buber and Levinas I think that we can refine the way rela-
tions are used in animal ethics today. A relational account of our obliga-
tions towards animal others informed by them would recognize the most 
fundamental relationship of being face to face, of knowing of the other, 
as sufficient to ground many (but not all) positive duties. Some duties 
would remain bound more formally to the relationship; e.g. in cases of 
obligations based on explicit commitments or contracts, when there is a 
certain compensation to be made, etc. In other cases however, while many 
relational accounts run the danger of dismissing some positive duties we 
have towards individuals, Buber and Levinas’ ethics of relation allow us to 
counter the danger of partiality and do more justice to our moral obliga-
tions towards the individual animal. 
1. the emeRgence of ReSponSibility in the encounteR
Buber and Levinas both develop relational accounts, in which the funda-
mental ethical element is not knowledge of the capacities of the other but 
rather the encounter. As such they both recognize that the relation is cen-
tral for moral and political considerations but not in the traditional liberal 
sense that my concern for the other limits my freedom to act as I wish and 
thereby draws the line of my own (private) actions. Rather the relation is 
where both moral agent and moral patient emerge as such and it is thereby 
foundational for ethics. 
Martin Buber considers relations to be central because of their funda-
mental role in selfhood. For Buber, there is no I outside of a relation. This 
goes beyond the role of intersubjectivity in the recognition of the subjectiv-
ity of the other. For Buber the relation is the beginning and the fundament 
of ethics: “[…] in the beginning was the relation” (Buber 1970, 69). He 
rejects the idea of the atomic I that exists independently and then gets into 
a relation – rather it is being in a relation that is constitutive of selfhood. 
In Buber’s moral ontology there are two modes of being in a relation: 
the I-It and the I-You. The realm of the I-It is that of goal-directed atti-
tudes, judgements and actions, of perception, emotion, imagination, voli-
tion, sensation and cognition (Buber 1970, 54). In an I-It relation, the I 
experiences the other as an It, i.e., it experiences, perceives and recognizes 
aspects of the other as an object. Ethically, this corresponds to encounter-
ing the other as a being with properties and capacities.
The I-You on the other hand is the realm of encounter and relation and 
can be situated in three spheres – in life with nature, with human beings 
and with “spiritual beings” (geistige Wesenheiten) (Buber 1970, 56). What 
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is meant by the latter sphere is not that of spirits and esoteric phantasm but 
the area of human creativity; most paradigmatically art. 
Being the I of an I-You relation does not depend on the qualities – in 
animal ethics we can think of capabilities – of the other. It is rather my 
saying of You, of being in the ethical stance that makes an I out of me and 
this in turn is what makes a moral agent of me: 
Only in the relation is he my You, outside the relation between us this You 
does not exist. […] Neither is my You identical with the It of the other nor 
is his You identical with my I. What I owe the person of the other is that I 
have this You; but my I – which should be understood as the I of this I-You 
relation – I owe to the saying of you, not to the person to whom I say You. 
(Buber 1963, 596)
What characterizes this encounter and distinguishes it from the experience 
of the other as an It is that here one is faced with a moral demand, one is 
addressed by the other or by the situation. Experiencing the other or the 
situation in the realm of the I-It is not amoral but it is the saying of You, the 
attentiveness towards what the situation demands of me as a moral agent is 
what turns me into one. The sphere of the I-It is also ethically relevant – it 
is here that the agent has to take into account the properties of the actors 
and elements of the situation when deciding how to act. Applied to animal 
ethics this means that for moral agency the relation is a condition sine qua 
non, without which the person does not exist as a moral agent and similarly 
taking into account the capacities of the other is a condition, without which 
she cannot act. Both relation and capacities are necessary conditions, nei-
ther is sufficient by itself.
Levinas, Buber’s junior by nearly thirty years, was inspired and influ-
enced by him. Like Buber, Levinas considers relations to be foundational 
for human selfhood and moral agency. The human emerges from the 
encounter with the Other: “It is not that there first would be the face, and 
then the being it manifests or expresses would concern himself with justice; 
the epiphany of the face qua face opens humanity” (Levinas 1991, 213). As 
in Buber then, it is not that I am first faced with a knowledge of properties 
but rather in the face-to-face with the other I have the opportunity of open-
ing to the ethical  1. 
 1 When asked if animals have a face Levinas falters: “You ask at what moment one 
becomes a face. I do not know at what moment the human appears but what I want to 
emphasize is that the human breaks with pure being, which is always a persistence in 
being. This is my principal thesis. A being is something that is attached to being, to its 
own being. That is Darwin’s idea. The being of animals is a struggle for life. A struggle for 
life without ethics” (Levinas 1988, 172). 
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Levinas dismisses the attempt to understand the Other on the basis 
of their capacities as a presumption. The Other cannot be grasped by her 
qualities because she is “infinitely transcendent, infinitely foreign” (Levinas 
1991, 194) – it is not possible to understand her. In Buberian language, 
my access to the Other is not exhausted by experiencing her in an I-It 
relation and in attempting to do so we leave out something necessary for 
Ethics. Rather the recognition of the Face comes before and is constitu-
tive of humanity and more specifically of moral agency. For Levinas, Ethics 
not Ontology is first philosophy, because Ethics breaks with Being; the 
encounter with the Other is the transcendent origin of my responsibility.
Hilary Putnam clarifies the Levinasian understanding of the moral 
agent by applying the term “mensch”, a thick description of what a human 
being is as a moral agent: 
[…] for Levinas, to be a human being in the normative sense (to be what 
Jews call a mensch) involves recognizing that I am commanded to say 
hineni – Here I am. […] If you have to ask, “Why should I put myself out for 
him/her?” you are not yet human. (Putnam 2008, 75) 
In a similar vein, Buber writes of “being there” as the moral stance, the 
state of being open and attentive to the moral demand that founds my 
responsibility in the given situation. The attentiveness to recognize and the 
readiness to respond to the need of the other is a positive duty that adds to 
negative duties of abstaining from harming her. Thus it is a stronger moral 
demand; not simply a letting be but an active being, an active doing:
If I withstand, if I move towards it, if I encounter it genuinely, i.e., with the 
verity of my whole Wesen (being), then, and only then am I “actually” there. 
[…] If I am not really there, then I am guilty. […] The original state of being 
guilty is the Remaining-by-oneself.  2 
Being in a relation is thus the origin of my responsibility and obligation 
towards the other, without it being evident what this responsibility and 
obligation require me to do in a particular case. General principles and 
ready-made answers may not only not help me but positively hinder me 
from responding to the moral demand of the situation, if they hold me back 
from saying hineni, being at the service of the other and being there (Buber 
[1939] 2002, 136). While this may sound like a version of the discretionary 
argument, in fact it runs counter to it, for here the agent is not absolved 
of her responsibility towards the other. Where she withholds herself, she 
moves out of the sphere of ethics. 
 2 Buber, Martin. “Das Problem des Menschen”. In Werke. Erster Band: Schriften zur 
Philosophie, translated by B.I.S., 363. München - Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider Verlag.
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In these fundamental elements of their moral philosophies, Levinas 
and Buber are in agreement with each other  3. They appear to be precur-
sors of contemporary animal ethicists who point to inter-subjective recog-
nition as foundational for our (negative) duties. Donaldson and Kymlicka 
for example write:
We believe that respecting inviolability is, first and foremost, a process of 
intersubjective recognition – that is, the first question is simply whether 
there is a “subject” there, whether there is “someone home”. This process 
of intersubjective recognition precedes any attempt to enumerate his or her 
capacities or interests. (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 30)
However, while Buber and Levinas thus share the starting point of relational 
animal ethicist, they come to different conclusions. A common move in con-
temporary relational animal ethics is to move from the role of relationality 
to differential rights and duties such as membership rights. While the family 
member, the companion, the friend, or even the compatriot can be situated 
in more or less central in concentric circles of moral obligation in relational 
theories, for Buber and Levinas the recognition of the fundamental nature 
of the relation for ethics has no such implication. Here we have a relational 
ethics, which does not refer to membership rights and where the relation-
ship I have with the other, while it is foundational for my responsibility and 
obligation, is not foundational for what is due to the other. 
In other words, what Buber and Levinas’ accounts enable us to do is to 
use the premise of inter-subjectivity not to found special or additional obli-
gations based on the relation between the agent and the patient but rather 
to bring out the moral agent as such in the encounter. We are constituted 
as an agent in the moment of the encounter and the relation is constitutive 
of our moral selfhood because we are faced with the demand of the situ-
ation and we become moral agents if we respond to that demand. If our 
moral selfhood and agency were constituted only in an encounter with the 
friend or the neighbor, co-citizen or in other forms of shared membership 
relations, we would still be far off from the moral encounter. We would in 
fact still be un-faced by the Other or in Buber’s words, we would still be 
with us, remaining with ourselves, we would not have gone ourselves to 
meet the needy other.
This should not be understood as an unrealistically demanding, almost 
religious call to the moral agent. It rather touches upon something very 
elementary: the moral situation only comes about when I respond to the 
 3 For a detailed discussion of their convergence and divergence compare Atterton, 
Peter, Matthew Calarco, and Maurice Friedman, eds. 2004. Levinas & Buber. Dialogue 
and Difference. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.
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demand of the situation and that demand is to be found in my saying of 
You, in my letting myself be addressed by the other in her need, prior 
to investigating her properties. A narrower relational account of positive 
duties loses sight of this claim about moral agency.
The link between the emergence of the moral agent and the moral 
demand is the moral obligation or the responsibility as the readiness to 
respond to that demand. Both Buber and Levinas consider intersubjectiv-
ity as central in becoming a moral agent in that the encounter gives me 
infinite responsibility. It is infinite because I am called, I am addressed by 
the situation and the call is infinite whereas I am not. This I think is the 
central corrective that the debate about relationality in animal ethics can 
gain from Buber and Levinas: the relation, the encounter is where Ethics 
and the moral agent emerge from and what this emergences does is to make 
the moral agent fully responsible: the agent is at the service of the other, in 
Buber’s terms she is “there” with her whole being, in Levinas’ terms she 
comes après vous. That she is not able to respond to that demand fully in 
her human finiteness does not diminish the obligation.
2. gRandmotheR ethicS
Arguing by using Buber and Levinas, the discretionary argument in the 
problem of wild animals runs the danger of pausing ethics by making a 
distinction between our duties of non-maleficence and beneficence and 
restricting the scope of the latter by relations rather than by the need of the 
moral patient. Another common objection to considering humans as fully 
obligated to respond to the problem of animals in the wild revolves around 
practicability, i.e. the difficulty and perhaps even impossibility of coming 
up with a system of action that would enable non-human animals in the 
wild to avoid suffering and death. Related to this objection is a common 
reminder that we should accept some cases of suffering and/or death as 
facts of life, rather than seeing them as a moral tragedy. Donaldson and 
Kymlicka for example write: 
This is not just because the scientific task of solving the problem of death 
seems enormous, but also because theories of justice must operate within 
certain defined parameters, including the acceptance that we are embodied, 
mortal beings. We need to start with an acceptance of human nature as it is 
(or might plausibly become), not a conception which is no longer recogniz-
ably human. If in the future we become “post-human”, then we will need a 
new theory of justice to deal with the new beings we have become. But for 
now, we need a theory of justice for us as we are.
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Similarly, we need a theory of justice for wild animals as they are. Viewed 
this way, predation amongst wild animals, who are outside the circumstances 
of justice with respect to one another’s flourishing, should be seen, not as the 
kind of tragedy we should seek to overcome, but as the kind of tragedy we 
should accept as a parameter of their lives for the foreseeable future (Hail-
wood 2012: 312). (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2013, 159)
This is an important point and often appears in a strand of moral reasoning, 
which is quite widespread in folk philosophy and which I shall refer to as 
“grandmother ethics”  4. According to this stance there are certain facts of 
life like the inevitability of suffering and death. It is a sign of (moral) imma-
turity and naiveté not to come to terms with these and instead argue that 
there should be certain mechanisms to keep these aspects of life in check as 
much as possible. Certain things, grandmothers argue, are the way they are 
and to rebel, protest or try to fight the inevitable is immature and pointless. 
Wild animal suffering seems to be just such a case. The little fish is doomed 
to be eaten by the big fish; this is the case in nature outside the sphere of 
justice, and is even required by balance, by the way life just is. Attempting 
to find alternative ways is not only difficult, but positively dangerous, as it 
could endanger the perfect equilibrium, which supports life  5. 
The analogy to the appearance of grandmother ethics in politics is per-
haps one possible way to evaluate it. The view that the world is the stage 
for immense suffering and death may be shown to be an empirical fact but 
it is by no means clear why this fact should lead moral agents to accept it 
as a necessity or as a positive good. One example of alternative ways of 
reacting to these facts of life comes from the Buddhist tradition, which also 
takes the vast amount of suffering on earth as its starting point. Its response 
is that the morally worthy way of life is the way of life that reduces suffering 
and goes on to explicate what such a life consists in. A very different tradi-
tion likewise takes as its starting point the fact of life that humans are rivals 
for resources, recognition and safety. Hobbesian contractarianism and 
its successors take this fact of life to be a given and argue for the need to 
 4 Donaldson and Kymlicka make it very clear that their group-differentiated model 
does not exclude non-members from the scope of justice or political decision making 
(Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011; 2013). However in the theory of justice for wild animals 
a plea for accepting the suffering of animals as a tragedy to be accepted rather than one 
to be overcome, does not appear in the same way in the case of domesticated and liminal 
animals. 
 5 For some, this stance corresponds to the environmentalist position, in particular 
to adherents of Aldo Leopold’s Land Ethics or Arne Naess’ Deep Ecology. Mark Sagoff 
(1984) argues that the gap between animal liberation advocates, who put individual moral 
patients in the centre of their ethics and environmental ethicists, who argue for a holistic 
position, which puts the biotic community in the centre of their ethics, is insurmountable.
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overcome this state of affairs by organizing communities under a common 
contract, aiming to protect citizens from each other and guaranteeing basic 
rights. While these approaches also focus more on negative duties, grand-
mother ethics seem to be neither a necessary response to the facts-of-life 
nor is it what has historically been put forward and politically developed 
into various forms of state and society. 
Are these examples enough for a dismissal of the crux of the grand-
mother ethics? Is our resistance against what the facts-of-life dictate in fact 
misguided? Is a life that embraces the facts-of-life as both unavoidable and 
exhilarating a life better lived? Robert Nozick’s thought experiment of the 
experience machine for example aims to demonstrate that many humans 
consider a life sheltered from unwanted experiences not preferable to what 
they consider to be a life more authentic in the reality of the experience, of 
the person we are and an unsimulated world, i.e. in touch with the facts-
of-life  6.
Turning to Buber and Levinas might also help us here. Authenticity or 
an acceptance of the facts of life, as highly we might value them, seems to 
be a good that may or may not be selected as the ultimate one by the moral 
agent herself. It does not rattle at the responsibility that she has towards 
the moral patient in need, as it is the encounter with the patient that both 
founds and specifies her obligation towards the other. What precisely fol-
lows as a guide to action is left unspecified but in contrast to a relativisation 
or dismissal of moral obligation, a relational ethics informed by Buber and 
Levinas would remain committed to considering the situation as belonging 
to the realms of ethics and in cases where no assistance is possible, as a 
moral tragedy.
3. conSideRationS foR animal ethicS
A relational animal ethics informed by a Buberian and Levinasian under-
standing of moral obligation together with a cautious approach to grand-
mother ethics would not agree with other relational theories that we have 
no or few positive duties towards animals in the wild. Even if we agree 
that as moral agents our membership to the human community informs 
 6 This interpretation of Nozick’s experience machine does not go uncontested. In a 
recent paper, De Brigard developed an alternative explanation of the effect, arguing that 
the intuition to remain in the virtual world or to opt for the real one, depends not so much 
on an independent evaluation of the two, but rather on an aversion to abandon the life 
one had before being offered the choice or conversely a psychological bias on retaining 
the status quo (De Brigard 2010).
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some of our moral obligations depending on the history of relationships 
and entanglements (Palmer 2010, 89), taking into account these elements 
help specify what our duties are in a given situation, not whether or not we 
have them. 
Palmer uses the example of kittens who were left in a dumpster by a 
pedigree-valuing cat breeder. She argues that because “kittens are members 
of a breed and species from which humans derive benefit”, the person who 
finds these kittens has a weak moral reason to assist: “[…] the kittens have 
been harmed by a human and have been created, more generally, within 
a human-directed institutional framework that brings gains to people 
through making vulnerable animals”. According to Palmer, our respon-
sibility as moral agents to assist other animals in need in this case comes 
from two sources: firstly, we profit by the traditional use of cat-production 
and secondly, we share a species with the harmer of the kittens. Outside of 
these relations, we have no duties to assist.
In a relational framework informed by Buber however, our responsibil-
ity comes from our capability of responding to the moral demand of this 
situation, we are obligated to help because we know of the plight of the 
kittens and we are receptive to the moral demand. Our membership to the 
species of the culprit is irrelevant. A hypothetical alien in the same situation 
must be, in Palmer’s account, under no obligation to assist the kittens, even 
if it were a moral agent superior to humans. Dishing out rights and respon-
sibilities according to group membership might be (as yet) unavoidable in 
some contexts like citizenship but in this case such considerations seem to 
lead us to neglect the individuality of beings, not only as moral agents but 
also as moral patients.
Levinas and Buber’s accounts help us to distinguish between the 
descriptive and normative elements of relationality. As diverse relational 
accounts are, they seem to agree that humans are embedded in a network 
of relations, and are not the atomistic, calculating moral accountants which 
utilitarians are sometimes accused of imagining. Relationality is constitutive 
of our selfhood, both as agents and patients. However, arguing with Levi-
nas and Buber we must be wary of taking the implications of descriptive 
relationality too far into our normative theories. Relationality founds our 
special responsibility in special cases but it also cuts into our responsibility 
in other, more impersonal cases. This means that the very choice of which 
relationships are nurtured to what degree (in as much as we have control 
over this) becomes itself a moral question. Having children, having many 
children are accordingly not only personal life choices, they are also moral 
questions by not only by adding to the number of beings who consume the 
resources of the earth but also by creating responsibilities and obligations 
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that take away from our individual capacities to honor other moral obliga-
tions.
Relations are constitutive of moral selfhood and agency in a very fun-
damental way. But they are not constitutive of what is due to the moral 
patient. The moral demand emanating from the moral patient can be 
boundless. Relations are among the practical factors that determine which 
of the infinity of demands can be met. They might add to the already exist-
ing factors, e.g. in a case of two comparable demands, the fact that I have 
a relationship with one, be it only the fact that I know of her, adds to my 
obligation but it doesn’t found it. In Buberian terms I remain guilty for not 
answering to the other. But what makes all the difference is whether this is 
recognised as a moral tragedy or dismissed from the moral sphere as a fact 
of life to be accepted; whether the moral agent is exempt of responsibility 
or incapable of answering the demand. If we opt for the language of grand-
mother ethics, we run the risk of stopping doing ethics.
4. open queStionS
The benefit of bringing Buber and Levinas into the discussion about rela-
tional ethics in general and in animal ethics in particular is that they help us 
to distinguish between the descriptive claim that relations are foundational 
for human selfhood and agency and the normative claim that certain obli-
gations exist only in the context of certain relations. While both claims are 
well-founded, I take the case of animal suffering in the wild to show that 
relations may add to obligations but not take away from them.
Some of these relational obligations are straightforward: if I am in the 
relation of contract, say, then I committed myself to certain obligations and 
it is morally wrong of me to neglect or dismiss these. If as the member of 
a certain race, sex, species or polity I profit from a history of the exploi-
tation of others, this adds to my positive obligations towards them, as in 
cases of compensation or positive discrimination. If I am responsible for 
the existence of certain beings, this likewise gives me certain obligations 
than towards other beings. Relations in short can be the foundation of 
obligations both voluntary and involuntary, both explicitly undertaken and 
implicitly.
However, there is a danger in relational ethics, of making arbitrary 
qualities relevant beyond such cases of obligation. And, since we have lim-
ited resources, is it not morally questionable to favor the lesser interests of 
the other in a (close) relation to the more fundamental interests of others 
we know not of? Has not the socio-political history of achievements had in 
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its core precisely the overcoming of chauvinism, favoritism, nepotism for 
the sake of a more egalitarian distribution of resources and justice?
The application of relational ethics to the problem of animals in the 
wild thus opens two questions not just about this particular problem but 
ethics in general. Firstly, is not cold impartiality far too valuable an attain-
ment to risk, both in ethics and in politics? What Buberian and Levinasian 
accounts of moral obligation seem to indicate is that we need to fine-tune 
our moral sensibilities to respond to both elements of the moral situation: 
the moral demand emanating from the need of the other as the source of 
my moral agency and cold impartiality to counteract the danger of arbitrary 
moral responses.
Secondly, if we agree that relations are constitutive of selfhood and that 
we have limited resources in how effective a moral agent we can become, 
then what sort of relations should be created becomes a moral question 
itself. Ought we to have children as this keeps us from responding to other 
moral demands? Is it permissible to cultivate exclusive friendships or part-
nerships, which leave us little room to respond to the needs of strangers? 
5. concluSion
Relational approaches in animal ethics are varied and propose very differ-
ent ideas about the ways relations are relevant to the question of human 
obligations towards other animals in general and animals in the wild in 
particular. While Donaldson and Kymlicka for example, develop a group-
differentiated account, which includes a theory of negative and positive 
obligations for animals in the wild, for Palmer “What goes on in the wild is 
not our moral business” (Palmer 2011). My concern in this paper was with 
two elements of relational ethics, which appear in different forms in rela-
tional accounts as different as these two examples: the tendency to attribute 
moral obligation in a differentiated way depending on group-memberships 
of both the moral agents and patients and the persuasiveness of what I call 
grandmother ethics. The result of these elements is a dismissal in varying 
degrees of human moral responsibility towards some groups or individuals 
of animals according to their group membership. 
I have argued that both relations and capacities are necessary to deter-
mine our moral obligations towards other animals. In doing so, we need to 
distinguish the political question of how resources and duties are allocated 
from the question of what the rights are – and capacity accounts remain 
central in determining these (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011). The capaci-
ties of a moral patient remain necessary for establishing what state of affairs 
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is preferable for her life to go better rather than worse, even if we may 
not always be in the position to find moral agents whom we could call to 
duty. Relations are part of a moral situation but they are not constitutive 
of it in the sense that a moral demand exists only if there is an agent with 
a relationship that it can latch onto. Taking relations as the starting point 
of a description of a situation with a moral demand puts not the patient 
who is the object of possible harm or benefice in the center of the moral 
situation but the moral agent. But the demand on the moral agent and 
therefore the real obligation she has emanates from the situation in general 
and the patient in particular. In a moral situation with a recognizable moral 
demand therefore, the moral obligation of the agent cannot be argued away 
by recourse to (special) relations.
Rather such considerations can only add to morally relevant factors 
in certain cases as in obligations which have been undertaken, a history 
of exploitation or compensation, or e.g. in an extreme life-boat situation, 
where a choice between a companion animal and a hitherto unknown wild 
animal is required. In contrast a relational approach informed by Buber and 
Levinas remains patient-centred and gives precedence to the need of the 
patient rather than to the relationship between the agent and the patient.
Whether we subscribe to the view that the suffering of animals in the 
wild is a moral tragedy or a fact of life to be accepted might seem to be 
a matter of definition which makes no real difference. However I believe 
that grandmother ethics involves the danger of neglect and dismissal. It can 
support the decision not to channel resources and research into the possi-
bilities of making the lives of animals in the wild go better, which is in itself 
an open moral question. We should be wary of the danger that the “facts 
of life” as they are now, should restrict and impoverish our moral outlook. 
Our responsibility, to stay with Buber and Levinas, remains infinite.
How can this really help us in animal ethics? My answer is that it helps 
us to differentiate more clearly between the source of our responsibility 
and the content of moral principles. Relational ethics often tries to find 
answers to normative questions on what to do on the relations and rela-
tions are indeed an element of the moral situation that have to be taken 
into account. However, relations in Buber and Levinas’ account are the 
source of our responsibility without answering the question of what this 
responsibility requires in a given particular case. What they do to our 
debate in animal ethics is to provide a warning of the danger of confusing 
relations in these two functions and thereby of excluding some animals in 
practice from the moral sphere. They show that referring to relations can 
make sense only in certain respects and that the encounter is misused if the 
resulting normative stance is one of diminished responsibility.
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My conclusion is in fact quite modest: relational theories that argue 
from intersubjectivity to discretion are not without alternatives and Buber 
and Levinas make strong cases for not confusing the source of our moral 
responsibility with the normative question of what we should do. A critique 
of grandmother ethics also goes against the discretionary argument, which 
might tend to lead to a premature dismissal of the problem of wild animals. 
Neither of these are sufficient to justify such a dismissal or even the neglect 
of this problem.
Siding with Buber and Levinas we can argue that the problem of wild 
animals is in fact central not only in animal ethics but in ethics precisely 
because here we are faced with whatever responsibility humans have as 
informed moral agents in the face of a tragedy that seems insurmountable. 
Taking on this task might not only enable us to make progress in this moral 
tragedy but it also promises to be rewarding in that it will help us refine our 
wider moral positions.
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